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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENfr
POINT ONE:
The trial court excluded Ostler's evidence regarding
the "moth phenomenon" on Rule 702 grounds that expert testimony
in the matter would not be helpful to the jury.

Wheeler attempts

to raise additional theories to support the exclusion.

This

court should not consider these previously rejected theories but
insteadf should focus on the Rule 702 issue alone.
POINT TWO:
The trial court ruled that expert testimony would add
nothing to the jury's understanding of th$ "moth phenomenon."
Wheeler's brief fails to explain how a layperson would not
benefit from expert testimony in the matter.

Closer examination

reveals that the jury would have been assisted by Ostler's expert
witnesses.
POINT THREE:
Both the trial court and Wheeler used the old common
law standard regarding expert witnesses instead of the broader,
more liberal standard promulgated in Rule 702.
POINT FOUR:
Wheeler introduced exhibits resting on the same
factual basis as the "moth phenomenon" (i.e., that Ostler's eyes
were, indeed, open at the time of the accident).

Since the

factual basis is the same as that supporting the occurrence of

the "moth phenomenon."

The trial court should have admitted

Ostler's evidence as rebuttal testimony.
POINT FIVE:
Under Rule 104, the jury is the proper decider of
issues of preliminary fact, not the trial judge.
POINT SIX:
Wheeler's violation of Federal drive-time regulations
is relevant to a determination of proximate cause.

Wheeler's

illegal parking set up a chain of events culminating in the
accident.

Wheeler is a proximate cause.

POINT SEVEN:
The trial court improperly denied Ostler the
opportunity to impeach Wheeler.

Impeachment was intended to show

Wheeler to be untruthful and was therefore, relevant.

Wheeler's

assertion that the standard of review in the matter of
impeachment is abuse of discretion is incorrect under Rule 607.1.
POINT EIGHT:
Wheeler's brief fails to adequately respond to
Huddleston v. U.Sf which states that when the probative value of
the evidence outweighs the risk of prejudice, other bad acts may
be used to support a conditional fact by a preponderance of the
evidence.

2

POINT NINE:
Ostler asserts that Wheeler's failure to discuss his
misstatement of law in closing argument is a concession in the
matter.

Such misstatement constitutes reversible error and

should be corrected.
POINT TEN:
If it is prejudicial to raise the issue of insurance
coverage during argument, it is likewise prejudicial to imply a
lack of insurance, particularly when such is not the case.
POINT ELEVEN;
The jury instruction regarding Wheeler's duty to place
warning devices erroneously introduced a "reasonable man"
standard when the regulations, in fact, demand a much higher
standard of care.
POINT TWELVE:
In instructing the jury on proximate causation, the
court's instructions were erroneous and misleading.
POINT THIRTEEN:
The trial court should have ruled as a matter of law
that Wheeler's illegal parking was a proximate cause of the
accident.

3

POINT FOURTEEN:
The trial court should have allowed an amendment of
Ostler's claims to include a claim for punitive cases.

Recent

cases elucidate the issue of punitive damages and should be
considered by the court.
POINT FIFTEEN:
Ostler's videotape re-creation of the accident should
be allowed into evidence.

This court should review the

foundation for the videotape on a de novo basis.
POINT SIXTEEN:
Questions relating to insurance are improper during
trial.

Howeverf during voir dire questions relating to insurance

are proper and should be allowed.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE

THIS COURT SHOULD NOT
CONSIDER THEORIES THAT WERE NOT
PROPERLY PRESERVED IN THE TRIAL COURT
The trial court excluded all of the evidence regarding
the "moth phenomenon."

This evidence was excluded solely on the

4

basis of Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence.*

Thus, the trial

court stated:
It seems to me that that's something that the
jury can, just as well as anyone else, can
infer and can determine from their own
experience in this type of a circumstance, . .
•

*

*

. . .I'm still persuaded that this is
something that the testimony of the expert is
not going to be particularly helpful to the
jury.
(R. 2226 and R. 2274. )
Despite this very clear ruling, Wheeler's brief
attempts to inject several new theories t<p justify the trial
court's ruling.

Wheeler's arguments on evidence are a bit

unclear, but they seem to include the following:
1.

Dr. Hulbert was not qualified as an expert.2
(Respondent's Brief at p. 5.)

1,1

If scientific, technical or other Specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue. . .an expert. \ .may testify thereto. .
^Actually, the trial court's ruling is to the contrary.
Counsel, I don't have any question of the
expertise of the doctor in several fields.
R. 2226.

5

2.

Dr. Hulbert has not formed an opinion based upon a
reasonable scientific probability.

(Respondent's

Brief at p. 5.)
3.

Dr. Hulbert did not have sufficient data to form
an opinion.

4.

(Respondent's Brief at p. 5 and 6.)

The field of Human Factors Research is not a valid
science.

(Respondent's Brief at p. 6 and 21.)

These grounds were either rejected by the trial court,
or not even raised there.3

Therefore, this Court should skip

over those issues and concentrate on the Rule 702 issue.
The Rule 702 issue is more fully analyzed in Point II,
below.

POINT TWO
WHEELER'S BRIEF TOTALLY FAILS
TO ANALYZE THE RULE 702 ISSUE
As noted in Point I, above, the trial court excluded
evidence of the "moth phenomenon" on the basis of Rule 702.4

-^Respondent's Brief does not cite to the record where those
various theories were raised. Compare Substitute Brief of
Appellant, p. 15 at para. J.

^For text of Rule 702, see fn. 1 above.

6

Wheeler's Brief almost totally ignores the Rule 702
issue.

(Brief of Respondent, p. 21-23.

of Appellant, p. 17-21.)

Compare Substitute Brief

Specifically, Wheeler's Brief fails to

explain how a lay juror would have been able to "understand" the
evidence without the assistance of testimony from Ostler's
experts.

Without this assistance, would a lay juror have any

knowledge of the "moth phenomenon" or "highway hypnosis?"

Or

would a lay juror understand that the blinking lights of a parked
truck tend to "lure" a sleepy driver into the lights?

Finally,

would a lay juror understand that the emergency lane is not
intended for rest stops to urinate?

(See generally, Substitute

Brief of Appellant at p. 19-21.)
Indeed, here we have expert testimony from Dr. Hulbert
that these matters are beyond the experience of the lay juror.
So, we are dealing here with a. . .fairly
recent understanding of these matters in
depth, [which would] not necessarily. . .be
expected to be available to the lay person.
Sure, they can understand it once its
explained.
(R. 2215.)
Indeed, Ostler's brief pointed put that some accident
investigators don't even understand the "moth phenomenon."
(Substitute Brief of Appellant, p. 19.
Again, Wheeler's Brief was silent.

7

Compare R. 2262-2264.)

If some accident

investigators don't understand the "moth phenomenon," the matter
is ipso facto beyond the ken of a lay juror.
In summary, the trial court incorrectly ruled that
expert testimony would not help the jury to understand the "moth
phenomenon."

However, Wheeler's brief has not explained how a

layperson could understand those matters without expert
assistance.

A closer look shows that a lay jury would have been

helped by Ostler's experts.

POINT THREE
RULE 702 HAS CHANGED THE
OLD COMMON LAW RULE REGARDING EXPERT TESTIMONY
Under the old common law, expert testimony was only
admissible on matters outside the knowledge of a lay jury.

The

common law on that issue has squarely been changed by Rule 702:
If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence. . .an
expert. . .may testify thereto. . .
Wheeler's brief relies upon the old common law.
Specifically, Wheeler argues that expert testimony may only be
received on matters outside the knowledge of a lay jury.

(See

Brief of Respondent at p. 21-2 3.)
Wheeler relies principally on the case of Day v.
Lorenzo Smith & Son, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 221, 408 P.2d 186 (1965).

8

The simple response is that Day was decided under the old common
law rule.

Rule 702 was adopted as part of the Utah Rules of

Evidence in 1983.
There are still a few scattered cases, after Rule 702,
which speak in terms of common knowledge.
at p. 22-23, Brief of Respondent.)

(See cases collected

However, those cases

represent an aberration which requires clarification:
It is still sometimes stated that the subject
matter must be beyond the common knowledge of
the average layman, i.e., there must be
unusual circumstances in the case. To the
extent that such articulation is another way
of stating that the experts' opinion is not
helpful to understanding the evidence or to
determining a fact in issue, i.e., is not
helpful to comprehension or explanation, the
statement is not objectionable.
Graham, Handbook of Evidence, §702.4, fn. 5 (1988 pocket part).
A clear explanation of the difference between the old
common law rule and the new Rule 702 is contained in the case of
In re:

Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 72 3

F.2d 238 (3rd Cir. 1983):
There are severe serious problems with the
trial court's formulation of standards for
determining admissibility under Rule 702.
First, the requirement for admissibility that
expert testimony be "beyond the jury's sphere
of knowledge" adopts a formulation which was
rejected by the drafters of Rule 702. While
that formulation applied prior to the
adoption of evidence rules, it no longer
applies.

9

Such a test is incompatible with the
standard of helpfulness expressed in
Rule 702. First, it assumes wrongly
that there is a bright line separating
issues within the comprehension of
jurors from those that are not.
Secondly, even when jurors are well
equipped to make judgments on the basis
of their common knowledge and
experience, experts may have specialized
knowledge to bring to bear on the same
issue which would be helpful.
3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's
Evidence 702[2]f at 709-9-10 (1982)
(footnotes omitted). Moreover, the
suggestion that the court must, in deciding
on admissibility, carefully scrutinize the
underlying assumptions, the inferences drawn,
and the conclusions reached, if followed
rigorously, would result in the trial court,
as distinguished from the fact-finder,
deciding the weight to be given to the
testimony.
Compare United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Winters, 729 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1984).
In summary, the trial court excluded expert evidence on
the basis that such matters were within the knowledge of a lay
jury.

However, that is now an outdated rule.

POINT FOUR
WHEELER'S BRIEF FAILS TO EXPLAIN
WHY THE "MOTH PHENOMENON" EVIDENCE
SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN RECEIVED AS REBUTTAL TESTIMONY
As explained in Points One, Two and Three, testimony on
the "moth phenomenon" was not received during Ostler's case-in10

chief.

The court reasoned that the "motli phenomenon" only works

if the driver is awake to see the lights of the parked truck.
The judge further ruled there was no showing that father Ostler
was awake:
I've heard nothing to indicate any basis for
a determination on his part thdt there was a
man that was either, that was not asleep or
that the was merely somewhat impaired in his
appreciation of things around t|im.
(R. 2226.)
However, the defense offered several photographs into
evidence showing how a parked truck woulcf have appeared to father
Ostler at various distances.

(Exs. 53 through 68.)

Ostler's

brief explained that those photographs r^st on exactly the same
factual basis as the "moth phenomenon."

Specifically, the

photographs of the parked truck are not iflaterial if father
Ostler's eyes were not open to see the trjuck.
Appellant, at p. 19.)

(See Brief of

But likewise, testimony on the "moth

phenomenon" is not material if father OslJler's eyes were not
open to "lure" him toward the lights.
In short, the trial court shoulld have admitted both
defendants' nighttime photos of the truck] and Ostler's rebuttal
testimony on the "moth phenomenon"; or thje trial court should
have rejected both pieces of testimony.

IHowever, it was

logically inconsistent to receive Wheeler's evidence (nighttime
photos) while excluding Ostler's evidence of the "moth
11

-phenomenon."

Both pieces of evidence were based on the

foundation that father Ostler's eyes were open to see the parked
truck.
Againf Qatlor'c brief was entirely silent on this
critical issue!

POINT FIVE
THE JURY—NOT THE JUDGE—SHOULD
DECIDE PRELIMINARY FACT ISSUES UNDER RULE 104
An important part of Ostler's case is the so-called
"moth phenomenon."

Ostler's theory is that father Ostler was

tired or in a reduced state of alertness.

In that state, father

Ostler thought he was following the lights of a moving truck.
Instead, father Ostler was "lured" into the rear of an illegally
parked truck.
p. 2 and 3.)

(See generally, Substitute Brief of Appellant, at
A threshold issue to this "moth phenomenon" theory

is whether father Ostler had his eyes open or whether he was
asleep.

12

Ostler's brief listed five pieces of evidence from
which a jury could conclude that father Ostler was awake.^
Substitute Brief of Appellant, at p. 4 and 5.)

(See

Wheeler's brief

responded by interpreting those facts in a different light.
(Brief of Respondent, at p. 10-11.)
However, Wheeler's brief misses the whole point.
issue is not how to interpret the facts.

The

Rather, the issue is who

should interpret the facts—the judge or the jury.

In this case,

the trial court judge (rather than the jury) interpreted the
facts:
. . .I'm not persuaded that in this case the
testimony is going to be helpful to the jury.
I've heard nothing to indicate any basis for
a determination on his part that there was a
man that was either, that was not asleep, or
that he was merely somewhat impaired in his
appreciation of the things arour)d him.
•

*

*

The facts are that the man ran off and hit
into the back of a truck. There is nothing
that's been shown or indicated that that is
consistent with being asleep, any less
than. . .consistent with being inattentive.
(R. 2226 and 2227. )

5

Specifically, the truck driver testified that father Ostler
appeared to be awake and changing lanes; shallow angle of impact;
father Ostler was not tired; curve in the roadway; and speed of
impact.
13

Ostler's opening brief argued that this issue is
controlled by Rule 104, Utah Rules of Evidence6.

Ostler's brief

cited the Federal Advisory Comment and the recent case of
Huddleston v. U.S.,

U.S.

108 S.Ct. 1496; 99 L.Ed.2d

771 (1988).
Wheeler's brief was absolutely silent on this crucial
issue.

Indeed, Wheeler's brief does not even mention Rule 104.

Nor does Wheeler's brief explain why the preliminary fact issue
(whether father Ostler was awake or asleep) was decided by the
judge instead of the jury.
Instead, Wheeler resorts to factual arguments.
Specifically, Wheeler gives several fact theories to reach the
conclusion that father Ostler was asleep (Brief of Respondent, at
p. 10-11).

However, those are really jury arguments.

The place

to make those arguments is before the jury—not an appellate
court.
In the words of Huddleston v. United States, (supra):
In determining whether the government has
introduced sufficient evidence to meet Rule
104(b), the trial court neither weighs
credibility nor makes a finding that the
government has proved the conditional fact by
a preponderance of the evidence. The court
b

"Preliminary Questions. When the relevancy of evidence
depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court
shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence
sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the
condition."
14

simply examines all the evidence in the case
and decides whether the jury could reasonably
find the conditional fact. . .by a
preponderance of the evidence.
Huddleston v. United States,

U-S.

; 108 S.Ct.

1496, 1501; 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988).
Actually, the shoe is on the other foot.

There is no

evidence in this record that father Ostler was asleep.

However,

without hearing evidence on the "moth phenomenon" as an
alternative, the jury could only speculate that father Ostler was
asleep.

(On closing argument, Wheeler suggested that father

Ostler was asleep.

R. 1925.)

The solution was simple.

The jury should have been

permitted to hear evidence on the "moth phenomenon."

Thereafter,

they could have weighed the facts and decided if father Ostler
was asleep or awake.

If he was awake, the jury could have

further considered the effect of the "moth phenomenon" as it
bears on this accident.

POINT SIX
A VIOLATION OF FEDERAL DRIVE-TIME
REGULATIONS IS RELEVANT TO PROXIMATE CAUSE
At trial, Ostler proferred evidence that Wheeler had
violated several federal regulations with respect to how long a
truck driver may be on duty.

(Drive-time regulations.)
15

The

trial court excluded all of that evidence.

Ostler's opening

brief argued that it was reversible error to exclude evidence of
those drive-time regulations.
p. 8-10 and p. 23.)

(Substitute Brief of Appellant, at

Wheeler's Brief responds that evidence of

the drive-time regulations was properly excluded.

Specificallyf

Wheeler argues that the only issue in the case was proximate
cause.

Wheeler says that a violation of the drive-time

regulations is not relevant to proximate cause.

(Brief of

Respondent, at p. 12-15.)
A.

Ostler's Fact Theory on Proximate Cause.
Ostler's fact theory on causation is as follows:
The Federal government sets regulations for how long a

trucker may drive.

49 C.F.R. 5395.3(a)(1); 49 C.F.R.

§395.3(a)(2); 49 C.F.R. §395.3(b); and 49 C.F.R. §391.2.
(Regulations quoted at p. 8 and 9, Substitute Brief of
Appellant.)

The purpose of those federal regulations is to keep

exhausted, and therefore dangerous drivers off the road.

(R.

2132.)
The symptoms of driving with fatigue are basically the
same as driving drunk.

(R. 2261.)

Wheeler was more than 200%

over his Federal drive-time limitation.

(R. 2133.)

Because of

his exhausted condition, Wheeler had to drink coffee to stay
awake.

The coffee acted as a diuretic causing Wheeler to stop
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and urinate.

(R. 2098.)

Or, perhaps to stop and sleep.

Substitute Brief of Appellant, p. 26, n.ll and p. 29.)
The purpose of the emergency lane is only for true
emergencies—not to stop and urinate.

(R. 2204-2205.)

Roby By

and Through Roby v. Kingsley, 492 So.2d 789 (Fla.App. 1986).
The emergency lane is designed in such a way that
drivers who are temporarily inattentive or sleepy have an
excellent chance to recover without injury.
R. 1368.)

(R. 2204-2205;

Truckers in general and Wheeler specifically are

trained that it is dangerous to park in the emergency lane.
(R. 2267, Ex. 82.)
If Wheeler's truck had not been illegally parked, the
Ostler car would have travelled harmlessly into the desert.

(R.

1028-1031.)
The lights of parked vehicles tend to "lure" tired
drivers toward the lights just as a moth to a flame.

(R. 2208-

2211. )
Father Ostler was not asleep at the wheel, rather he
was tired, and he was tricked by the "moth phenomenon."

(Brief

of Appellant, at p. 3-5.)
It is true that the jury may, or may not, have believed
all of that evidence.

However, there is certainly evidence in

the record to support a jury finding on each issue.
should have been given the opportunity to do so.
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The jury

B.

Legal Test for Proximate Cause.
Utah has adopted the "substantial factor" test to

determine proximate cause.'

Devine v. Cook, 279 P.2d 1073,

3 Utah 2d 134; Glenn v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 265 P.2d 1013, 1 Utah
2d 308; Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 P.2d 240 (Utah
1985) .
A "substantial factor" need not be the sole factor or
the primary factor.

McKenna v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesell-

schaft, et al., 558 P.2d 1018. Indeed, there may be several
"substantial factors" contributing to the same accident.

Morgan

v. Pennsylvania General Ins. Co., 275 N.W.2d 660 (Wise. 1979);
see also, W. Prosser, Law of Torts, Chapter 7, p. 268:
If the defendant's conduct was a substantial
factor in causing the plaintiff's injury, it
follows that he will not be absolved from
liability merely because other causes have
contributed to the result, since such causes,
innumerable, are always present. In
particular, however, a defendant is not
necessarily relieved of liability because the
negligence of another person [father Ostler]
is also a contributing cause and that person,
too, is to be held liable.
Also, it makes no difference how large or how small a
cause is to make it a "substantial cause."
448 P.2d 869 (Ariz. 1968).

McDowell v. Davis,

Proximate cause, like any other issue

^The "substantial factor" test is based upon Restatement of
Torts, 2d, §431.
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of fact, may be established by circumstantial evidence.
v. Acord, 608 S.W.2d 257 (Tex.App. 1980)•

Johnson

Finally, an act may be

a proximate cause even though the actor c^oes not foresee the
injury in the precise form in which it occurred.

Glenn v.

Gibbons & Reed Co., 265 P.2d 1013, 1 Utah 2d 308 (1954).
Many courts use a "but for" analysis, as a shorthand
way of determining the "substantial factor."
From such cases many courts ha^e derived a
rule, commonly known as the "bijt for" or
"sine qua non" rule, which mayjbe stated as
follows: The defendant's conduct is a cause
of the event if the event woulq not have
occurred but for that conduct; conversely,
the defendants' conduct is not a cause of the
event, if the event would have occurred
without it.
•

*

*

*

Restricted to the question of
alone, and regarded merely as
exclusion, the "but for" rule
explain the greater number of

Causation
al rule of
sjerves to
c|ases. . .

Prosser and Keeton on Torts, §41 (5th Ed. 1984).
Although no Utah cases have bee|n found which adopt the
"but for" test; the "but for" test is conlsistent with the
standard Utah instruction on proximate caiuse:
The proximate cause of an injury is that
cause which, in natural and con tinuous
sequence produces an injury, and without
which the result would not have! occurred.
J.I.F.U. 15.6.

Compare R. 1611 and 1617.

Pearson Enterprises, supra.
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See also, Mitchell v.

In short, the proximate cause issue may be resolved by
applying the "but for" test to the facts as follows:
1.

"But for" Wheeler's violation of the 10-hour, 15hour and 70-hour rules, he would not have been
exhausted.

2.

"But for" Wheeler's exhaustionf he would have not
made a dangerous non-emergency stop in the
emergency lane.

3.

"But for" Wheeler's exhaustion, he would have
observed numerous exits where he could have safely
stopped to urinate or sleep.

4.

"But for" Wheeler's tail lights in the emergency
lanef Father Ostler would not have been tricked by
the "moth phenomenon."

5.

"But for" the illegally parked truck, which
blocked the "safe recovery zone," father Ostler
would have run harmlessly into the desert.

The case of Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, 671 P.2d
217 (Utah 1983) is helpful.

Harris is the landmark Utah case on

the issue of superseding or concurrent causation.

Of course,

that is the exact issue involved in the instant case.
a bus had stopped to pick up passengers.
not see the parked bus in time.

In Harris,

A following driver did

The following car hit the bus.
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One of the passengers in the car was injured.

The plaintiff

(i.e., the injured passenger from the car) claimed, inter alia,
that the bus had faulty tail lights.

Plaintiff offered evidence

of subsequent repair records to show that the tail lights were
faulty.

The trial court excluded the repair records.

Our

Supreme Court held that:
Although the alleged malfunctioning of the
brake lights of the bus may havG been caused
by the accident itself, the plaintiff's
theory was that the lights were defective
prior to the accident and that the defect was
a causative factor. Under the circumstances,
whether the lights were malfunctioning and
whether they contributed to the accident were
questions of fact for the jury. In short, it
was error to exclude the evidence.
671 P.2d at 222.

(Emphasis added.)

The teaching of Harris is that evidence of proximate
cause should be admitted where there is ai theoretical link
between the negligent act and the injury.

Ultimately, the jury

will decide if causation exists, but the jury is entitled to
hear all evidence which might assist thent in reaching that
conclusion.

Likewise, it was absurd, in Ithis case, for the jury

to be instructed that Wheeler was negligent for parking in the
emergency lane, while excluding evidence that violation of the
10-hour rule, the 15-hour rule and the 7(i-hour rule started a
chain of events which ultimately led Wheeler to be involved in
the accident.
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C.

Purpose of the Drive-Time Regulations.
Wheeler's main argument is that the drive-time

regulations are intended to protect the public from truckers who
are actually driving.

Since Wheeler was not actually driving

(but illegally parked), Wheeler argues that the drive-time
regulations are not relevant.

(Brief of Respondent, p. 12-14.)

The problem is that Wheeler does not cite any
testimony, case law, or legislative history to support his theory
on the purpose of the regulation.

On the contrary, the expert

testimony in this record is that the purpose of the drive-time
regulations is to keep exhausted drivers off the road.
(R. 2132.)

Case law also supports that viewpoint.

See United

States v. Sawyer Transport, 337 F. Supp. 29 (Minn. 1971).
Compare Laird v. Travellers Ins. Co., 267 So.2d 714 (La. 1972).
Furthermore, Wheeler cites no authority for the
proposition that the purpose of a statute is relevant to
proximate cause.

In this case, negligence had already been

decided as a matter of law.

What remained was only the issue of

proximate cause.
Proximate cause may exist even though Wheeler did not
foresee this type of accident.
1013; 1 Utah 2d 308 (1954).

Glenn v. Gibbons & Reed, 265 P.2d

Since Wheeler was not required to

foresee this type of accident, the purpose of the statute would
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be irrelevant to proximate cause.^

Rather, the search for

proximate cause is simply a matter of tracing the chain of events
from the time of the injury backward to t[he point of the alleged
negligence.

Jordan v. General Growth Development Corp., 67 5

S.W.2d 901 (Mo. App. 1984).

Furthermore, evidence which may be

irrelevant on issue of negligence, may nevertheless, be relevant
and admissible on the issue of proximate pause.

Kellar v.

General Motors, 21 Fed. Rules Evid. Serv. 461 (4th Cir. 1986—
unpublished).
D.

Pearce v. Wistisen or Rule 403.
Wheeler argues that evidence on violation of the drive-

time regulations was excluded pursuant to Rule 403, Utah Rules
of Evidence.^
However, it is by no means cleatr the trial court judge
had Rule 403 in mind when he excluded the evidence.

Certainly,

Wheeler has not cited any portion of the Record in which the
judge made a Rule 403 determination.

8

In fact, the only evidence is that the type of accident
was, in fact, foreseeable. See Substitute Brief of Appellant, at
p. 10, 11, 64, 65.
9

"Although relevant, evidence may bel excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice. . ."
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It is generally said that the more essential the
evidence to a party's case, the greater the probative value
under Rule 403.

United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1239-40

(9th Cir. 1981). 10
Even if there is a Rule 403 problem in this case, this
court ought to consider the teachings of Hill v. Bache Halsey
Stuart Shields, Inc., 790 F.2d 817, 825-826;
We recognize that a trial court has broad
discretion to determine whether evidence is
relevant, and its decision will not be
reversed on appeal absent a clear abuse of
that discretion. [Citation omitted.] The
same standard of review applies to a trial
court's determination, under Rule 403 that
the probative value of evidence is outweighed
by its potential to prejudice or confuse the
jury or lead to undue delay. Nevertheless, a
district court's decision need not be
outlandish or malicious to rise to the status
of clear abuse. Rather, the reviewing court
need only be firmly convinced that a mistake
has been made.

l^This case is easily distinguished from Pearce v. Wistisen,
701 P.2d 489 (Utah 1985). In Pearce, evidence of alcohol was
excluded because the accident happened nearly two days after the
use of alcohol and after the alcohol was completely out of his
system. In this case, Wheeler pulled his truck off the road
specifically because he was fatigued in violation of Federal
regulations. The accident occurred while he was still in that
fatigued condition and as a direct result of violation of the
Federal regulations.
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POINT SEVEN
WHEELER HAS OFFERED NO GCbOD FAITH
ARGUMENT ON THE IMPEACHMENT ISSUES
Wheeler's story is that he stopped for three minutes in
the emergency lane to urinate.
testimony.

Ostler sought to impeach that

The purpose of the impeachment was to show that

Wheeler had been stopped for more than t0n minutes.
sleep.)

(Perhaps, to

If Wheeler was stopped over ten minutes, he had a

Federal duty to put out warning devices.

(See generally,

Substitute Brief of Appellant, at p. 24-26, 40-43.)

Wheeler's

response was simply that the impeachment was not relevant.
(Brief of Respondent, at p. 27-30.)
This inquiry breaks down into ^hree sub-issues.
Wheeler has made no good faith response to any of these subissues.
Sub-Issue No. 1:

Is the Impeaching Question Relevant?

The impeaching question was as follows:

"How long had

you been looking for a place to stop and urinate before you
actually stopped?"

Wheeler says that question was not relevant.

Specifically, Wheeler argues that the court had already directed
a verdict on negligence.

Therefore, why or how long Wheeler

stopped was not relevant.

(Brief of Respondent, p. 29-30.)
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However, Wheeler wholly misunderstands the law of
impeachment.

Impeachment evidence is always relevant if it tends

to show that a party is untruthful:
Since circumstantial evidence bearing on the
credibility of a witness tends to make the
existence of a fact of consequence in the
determination of the action more or less
probable than without such evidence,
circumstantial evidence bearing on the
credibility of a witness is relevant.
Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence, §607.2 (2d Ed. 1986).

In

other words, it is not necessary that the impeaching question be
relevant to Ostler's cause of action.

It is only necessary that

the impeaching question be relevant to whether or not Wheeler was
truthful.

If Wheeler was not truthful about looking for 30 min-

utes for a place to stop and urinate, the jury may conclude that
he was not truthful when he said he had only stopped for three
minutes.

(Perhaps, he stopped 30 minutes to sleep.)

Sub-Issue No. 2:

Should Ostler Have Been Permitted to Offer
Extrinsic Evidence to Contradict Wheeler's
Response to the Impeaching Question?

The impeaching question was:

"How long had you been

looking for a place to stop and urinate before you actually
stopped?"
answer.

In the actual trial, Wheeler was not permitted to
However, Ostler's offer of proof was that Wheeler would

answer that he was looking for approximately 30 minutes for a
place to stop.

(R. 2095.)
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The next issue is whether Ostle|r should have been
permitted to offer extrinsic evidence to contradict that
statement . -1-1 A textual explanation will be helpful.
On cross-examination, every permissible type
of impeachment may be employed for crossexamination [which] has as one iof its
purposes the testing of the credibility of
the witness. The use of extrinsic evidence
to contradict is more restricted due to
considerations of confusion of the issues,
misleading the jury, undue consumption of
time, and unfair prejudice raided by the
introduction of so-called collateral matters.
If a matter is considered collateral, the
testimony of the witness on direct or crossexamination stands—the cross-examiner must
take the witness' answer; extrinsic evidence,
i.e., evidence offered other than through the
witness himself, in contradiction is not
permitted. If the matter is nc}>t collateral,
extrinsic evidence may be introduced
disputing the witness' testimony on direct
examination or denial of truth of the facts
asserted in a question propounded on crossexamination.
Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence, §607.2 (2d Ed. 1986).

11

Ostlerfs extrinsic evidence was an aerial photograph.
(See Substitute Brief of Appellant, p, 25.) The photo showed
eight exits where Wheeler could have pulled off to urinate. The
inference was that Wheeler lied when he Said he was looking for
30 minutes; otherwise, he could have used any of the eight turnoffs. Although the conclusion is circumstantial, circumstantial
evidence is permitted for purposes of imjpeachment. McCormick on
Evidence, §185, para. 435-36 (Cleary Ed.| 1972); Graham, Handbook
of Federal Evidence, §401.1 (2d Ed. 1986|) .
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Ostler's opening brief cited four cases from McCormick
on Evidence, to support the proposition that the aerial map was
not collateral (Substitute Brief of Appellant, p. 27-29).
Wheeler has made no response whatsoever to the argument on
collateral versus non-collateral evidence.
Furthermore, the evidence was collateral under a second
theory.

After the wreck, Wheeler had a built-in bias to hide the

fact that he had violated a Federal regulation.H

Thus, he had a

motive to fabricate the story about stopping to urinate.

Where

cross-examination deals with bias, prejudice, or interest, the
impeaching material is never collateral.

United States v.

Robinson, 530 F.2d 1076, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v.
Harvey, 547 F.2d 720, 722 (2d Cir. 1976).

See also, Graham,

Handbook on Evidence, §607.7 (2d Ed. 1986).
Sub-Issue No. 3:

Standard of Review.

Wheeler's brief argues that the sole standard of review
for impeachment matters is abuse of discretion.
Respondent, at p. 30.)

(Brief of

However, Ostler's brief points out some

important exceptions to that rule.

Specifically, the trial

court has substantial discretion to regulate the scope of crossexamination.

However, the trial court does not have power to

l^if wheeler had stopped to sleep for over ten minutes, he
would have had a Federal duty to set out warning devices. See 49
C.F.R. §393.95; 49 C.F.R. §392.22(b).
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totally exclude cross-examination on a given subject.
(Substitute Brief of Appellant, p. 29.)

Wheeler's brief was

silent on this issue.
Sub-Issue No. 4;

Abuse of Discretion.

The trial court did not clearly understand the law of
impeachment.

Since the court based its ruling on a misunder-

standing of the law, discretion was abused-

(Substitute Brief of

Appellant, at p. 29-30).
Ostler's opening brief cited thfe following colloquy to
show that the judge was confused on the law of impeachment.
Wheeler's brief was wholly silent on thesie important issues.
THE COURT: Well, supposing he isays "I was
looking for 30 minutes?"
MR. DEBRY:

Then I impeach him.

THE COURT: Why? Because he's already,
that's consistent with his prior statement.
MR. DEBRY: There are many way^ to impeach,
your Honor. One mode of impeadhment is a
prior inconsistent statement. We are not
trying to impeach him with a pijior
inconsistent statement. We are trying to
demonstrate to the Jury that he lied under
oath.
THE COURT: Well, I disagree wi^th you, Mr.
Debry. I'm going to sustain the objection.
If that's the basis on which you are
attempting to get at it. It appears to the
Court that it has no, that that is not any
basis for impeachment.
(R. 2632.)
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After re-reading the transcriptr Ostler has found
additional support that the trial court did not understand the
law of impeachment:
Q: (By Mr. DeBry) Wellf the question, Mr.
Wheeler, now out of the presence of the Jury,
is: How long had you been looking for a
place to stop before you actually pulled
over?
A:

Approximately 30 minutes.

MR. DEBRY: Now, at that point, your Honor,
and that's what I anticipated he would say,
because that's exactly what he said in his
deposition.
•

•

*

•

Now. . .the purpose of the question is merely
to provide impeaching material. I'm not
putting this big chart in evidence yet, I'll
do it later. But I would later show by this
chart and others that he's talking out of
both sides of his mouth. He said "I was
looking for 30 minutes for a place to park."
We'll show he went by, you know, whatever,
two, three, four exits. And that's
inconsistent. I've pointed out an
inconsistency in his testimony.
THE COURT: Well, if that is his testimony
I'm going to sustain the objection, because
it doesn't show any discrepancy between that
and his testimony at deposition. There may
be a lot of reasons why he didn't accept
those turnoffs, Mr. DeBry. If he's not
familiar with the road, he may not have any
idea what you are getting into by pulling off
on those exits.
So the objection will be sustained.
(R. 2095-2096.)
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Obviously, the trial court judge acted as factfinder.
Obviously, the trial court judge supposed there was but one mode
of impeachment (prior inconsistent statement).

Ostler's brief

pointed out that there are several modes |of impeachment.13

The

trial court erred, as a matter of law, because it based its
ruling on a mistaken view of the law.

(See Substitute Brief of

Appellant at p. 29-30.)
Wheeler's brief failed to respond to the argument that
the trial judge was confused about the le(w of impeachment.

POINT EIGHT
WHEELER'S BRIEF FAIL$ TO
ADEQUATELY RESPOND TO THE LANDMARK CASE OF
HUDDLESTON V, U.S. REGARDING IfRIOR BAD ACTS
Ostler's brief argues that Wheeler was guilty of
certain bad acts.

Specifically, Wheeler was 25.25 hours over the

10-hour Federal limit; 26.7 5 hours over the 15-hour Federal
limit; and 86.2 5 hours over the 7 0-hour federal limit.
(Substitute Brief of Appellant, p. 9.)

It would, of course, be

improper to offer this evidence to show that Wheeler was a bad

^Ostler's opening brief incorrectly cited West's Handbook
on Evidence. (Substitute Brief of Appellant at p. 30.) The
correct citation should be, Graham, Handbook on Evidence §607.1,
For the convenience of the court, the section describing the
various modes of impeachment is found at &x±rj±rit A«
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man.

See Rule 404(b) and 608(b) Utah Rules of Evidence.

However, the evidence could be offered to show motive.
Specifically, that Wheeler had a motive to lie.

See Substitute

Brief of Appellant, at p. 32.
Wheeler's brief fails to adequately discuss Huddleston
v. United States,
(1988).

U.S.

; 108 S.Ct. 1496; 99 L.Ed.2d 771

Huddleston is a landmark case.

To the extent that

earlier Utah cases might disagree, this court should now
reconsider those cases in light of Huddleston.

POINT NINE
WHEELER'S BRIEF APPARENTLY
CONCEDES THAT COUNSEL MISSTATED
THE LAW IN CLOSING ARGUMENT AND THAT
SUCH MISSTATEMENT CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR
Ostler's opening brief argued that misstatements of law
were made in closing argument.

(Substitute Brief of Appellant,

at p. 32-36•)
Wheeler makes some limited response.
Respondent, at p. 36-37.)

(Brief of

However, nowhere does Wheeler claim

that his statements of law during closing argument were correct.
Obviously, Wheeler admits (as he must) that he did make
misstatements of law in closing argument.
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Ostler's brief also pointed out that the trial court
judge has no discretion in this area.

It is reversible error for

counsel to misstate the law in closing argument.
Brief of Appellant, at p. 33-34.)

(Substitute

Apparently, Wheeler also

concedes this crucial point.
Wheeler's sole defense is that the judge somehow cured
the error.

The judge said:

The jury is directed to look atj the
Instructions. They set forth tf\e law in that
regard. Statement of counsel i^ to be
disregarded except as it is accurate.
(R. 1927.)
The problem is that the judge didn't rule at all.

He

merely asked the jury to do his job for h^Lm.
Supposedly, the jury was to return to the jury room;
re-read the instructions; then compare th0se written instructions
with their memory of oral argument; and rteject any part of the
oral argument which didn't match the written instructions.
is, of course, an impossible task.

That

In a jsomewhat similar con-

text, our Supreme Court has stated:
That position suggests an unwarranted naivety
regarding human nature.
State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 11984).
In some future closing argument, a lawyer might mistakenly or intentionally misstate the law.
counsel will rise to object.

Presumably, opposing

If this case passes muster, the
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judge will no longer rule; rather, the judge will respond by
telling the jury to just read the instructions,

A very unfortu-

nate precedent will have thus been born,
Wheeler cites four old Missouri cases for the
proposition that the error could be cured by simply telling the
jury to follow the written instructions.
p. 36.)

(Brief of Respondent,

However, all of those older cases were in effect

overruled by Halford v. Yandell, 558 S.W.2d 400 (Mo. 1977).

(See

Substitute Brief of Appellant, at p. 35.)
Finally, Wheeler's brief discusses State v. Shickles,
760 P.2d 291, 85 UAR 3 (1988).
egregious than Shickles.

However, this case is more

In Shickles, the attorney corrected his

misstatement of law during argument.

In this case, Wheeler's

counsel never corrected the misstatement of law.

In short, in

this case there was no ruling by the judge, and there was no
correction by counsel.

Thus, the jury was easily misled.

POINT TEN
IF IT IS PREJUDICIAL TO
ARGUE INSURANCE COVERAGE AT TRIAL,
IT IS LIKEWISE PREJUDICIAL TO ARGUE
LACK OF INSURANCE COVERAGE
In closing argument, Wheeler's attorney suggested that
the defendants would have to pay any judgment from their own
pockets.

Ostler's brief argued that such comments were improper.
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(Substitute Brief of Appellant, at p. 37 and 38.)
brief makes a curious response.

Wheeler's

Wheeler claims that Ostler

improperly injected insurance into the tirial during the following
colloquy:
Q.

What is that yellow piece of paper you
read?

A.

I believe that was the statement I gave
the insurance man the day following.

(See Brief of Respondent, at p. 38.)
For purposes of argument, Ostler concedes that the
subject of insurance was improperly before the jury.-*-4

However,

the remedy for that situation should hav$ been a mistrial or a
curative instruction.
Apparently, Wheeler seeks to cure the insurance problem
with a falsehood.

In other words, it was true (even though

inadmissible) that Wheeler was insured.
testimony was before the jury.

Unfortunately, that

However, it was a falsehood for

Wheeler's counsel to cure that error by arguing that Wheeler had

14

Wheeler claims that this testimony was improperly
"elicited" by Ostler's counsel. (Brief cf>f Respondent, at p. 38.)
Actually, that testimony came in as a total surprise.
(R. 2074.)
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to pay any judgment out of his own pocket. i^>
opposite is true.

In fact, the

The insurance carrier will pay/cover all or

most of any judgment.
The Wheeler's argument that the defendants would
personally pay for any judgment, is another way of implying to
the jury that there is no insurance coverage.

There are sound

policy reasons to exclude the existence of insurance coverage
from the jury.

However, any argument of non-insurance should be

-"--'Ostler's opening brief cited the following statement from
Wheeler's closing argument:
This case is not to decide how much(sic)
injuries Ralph has. . .This case is to decide
whether Wheeler, F & R Roe and Albina are to
pay for the injuries to Ralph. . .
(R. 1930).
After re-reading the transcripts the following additional
irregularity is noted:
If you find that one percent of the cause of
this accident was his parking or the failure
to put out triangles, one percent, they
collect it all from defendants.
•

•

*

*

He [the judge] has instructed you to
determine if Stanley Wheeler was the cause of
this accident, and if you do, if you conclude
that, then the defendants pay.
(R. 1931.)
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excluded for the same policy reasons.

Hill v. Cloward, 377 P.2d

186 (Utah 1962).
Counsel's closing argument that Wheeler had to "pay for
the injuries" was especially egregious when seen in context.
Over Ostler's objections, Wheeler had already told the jury that
the truck was owned by one Ruby Roe, a bookkeeper; that the whole
company consisted of only two trucks; and that Ruby's husband had
recently died of cancer.

(R. 2779 and 2780.)

Likewise, the jury

was told that Wheeler would have to pay 100% of the damages, even
if he was only 1 percent negligent.

(R. 1511.

Compare R. 19 31.)

In summary, the jury was left with the impression that
there was no insurance coverage; that any judgment would come
from Wheeler's own pocket; that this was a small family business
in difficult circumstances; and that Wheeler would have to pay
for all of the damages even though he was only 1 percent
negligent.

Such arguments were greatly misleading and

prejudicial.

POINT ELEVEN
THE JURY INSTRUCTION ON
FLARES AND TRIANGLES ERRONEOUSLY
INTRODUCE A "REASONABLE MAN" STANDARD
Federal regulations require truckers to place warning
flares or triangles "as soon as possible, but in any event within
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10 minutes."

49 C.F.R. §392.22(b).

The trial court's instruc-

tion seemed to place a lesser duty on Wheeler.
Brief of Appellant, at p. 40-42.)
preting the regulation.

(See Substitute

Wheeler responded by inter-

Wheeler says:

The regulation that flares should be placed
"as soon as possible, but in any event within
ten minutes" inherently implies that it may
not be possible to place flares if to do so
would take longer than the time a vehicle is
stopped. . .The regulation does not
contemplate that warning devices must be
placed on all short stops.
(Brief of Respondent, at p. 42-43.)
The trouble is that Wheeler cites no cases or
legislative history for his interpretation.
testimony is to the contrary.

Indeed, the

Stopping a truck momentarily (even

to urinate) in the emergency lane can be deadly; and truck
drivers are so trained.

(Exhibit A to Brief of Appellant.

also, Substitute Brief of Appellant, at p. 64-66.)

Finally, the

regulations themselves state:
The objective of the Motor Carrier Safety
Assistance Program (MCSAP) is to reduce the
number and severity of accidents. . .
involving commercial motor vehicles by
substantially increasing the level of
enforcement activity and the likelihood that
safety defects, driver deficiencies and
unsafe carrier practices will be detected and
corrected.
49 C.F.R. §350.7.
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See

In short, it is deadly business for trucks to park even
momentarily in the emergency lane.
what it says.
urinate.

The regulation means exactly

Truckers ought to wait for the next rest stop to

If they can't wait, they have a Federal duty to put out

flares or triangles "as soon as possible."
Any other interpretation would encourage drivers to
casually make brief stops.

The Federal regulatory scheme

specifically anticipates that all such brief stops should be made
in designated highway rest areas.

(R. 1343.)

In short, the court gave a "reasonable man"
instruction.

However, the Federal regulation requires a

substantially higher standard.

POINT TWELVE
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION ON
PROXIMATE CAUSATION WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS
The most important instruction given by the trial court
was No. 25 on intervening independent causation.

That

instruction defined intervening independent causation solely in
terms of foreseeability.

Ostler pointed out that foreseeability

is not the sole requirement for proximate causation.
Restatement of Torts, 2d, §435(l). 16
16

For complete text, see Appendix
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See

The Restatement of Torts
*/

S4421' lists six factors that are important-in determining
whether an independent cause has intervened.

None of these

factors were included in the court's instruction to the jury.
(Foreseeability is not one of the six factors.)
Wheeler selectively lifts statements from prior Utah
decisions that discuss only foreseeability-

The implication is

that foreseeability is the sum and substance of intervening
causation.

The fact that such cases refer to foreseeability does

not mean that those cases define the scope and breadth of
intervening causation.

Those cases merely focused on one element

of causation (foreseeability) necessary to decide
cases before the court.

the particular

It was simply unnecessary for the court

to cite and analyze every segment of intervening causation to
decide those cases.

Further, the parties probably briefed only

the foreseeability factor in their appeals.

Accordingly, the

cases were decided on that basis only.
The Utah Supreme Court has, in fact, adopted all of
Restatement of Torts, 2d, §447.

Harris v. Utah Transit

Authority, 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983).

For complete text, see Appendix 1.
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Foreseeability is only a part of §447 i8 intervening
causation analysis.

The intervening causation factors in §447

include, (a) foreseeability of Ostler's conduct; (b) whether a
reasonable man would regard father Ostler\s conduct as
extraordinary; (c) whether Ostler's conduct was a normal
consequence of the situation created by Wheeler.

These are

disjunctive; if any one of the three is applicable, there is
liability.

These factors are not merely t^hree different ways of

saying foreseeability.
Section 447 presents two approaches.
viewed prospectively.

Factor (a) is

Factors (b) and (cj are viewed retro-

spectively. Neither (b) nor (c) require foreseeability; instead,
they operate in the absence of foreseeability.

The jury was told

to view the matter only prospectively, i.q., from Wheeler's
viewpoint before the accident.
argued.

This was What Wheeler's counsel

The jury never got the chance to analyze the case under

(b) and (c), i.e., looking at the accident after the fact.
Ostler further pointed out that part of the court's
instruction stated that the chain of causa|tion was broken "if the
actions of Stephen Ostler in causing the cbllision were. . .not
reasonably to be foreseen."

(R. 2958-2959i. ) This instruction

tells the jury to focus on the foreseeability of Stephen Ostler's
*-°For complete text, see Appendix 2.
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specific conduct, not the foreseeability of a generalized risk of
harm to passing motorists.

This is directly contrary to Rees v.

Albertson's, Inc., 587 P.2d 130 (Utah 1978), which states:
What is necessary to meet the test of
negligence and proximate cause is that it be
reasonably foreseeable, not that the
particular accident would occur, but only
that there is a likelihood of an occurrence
of the same general nature.
Wheeler simply ignores this error; instead he substitutes
glittering adjectives ("carefully," "insightful,") about the
court's instruction in place of legal analysis •

POINT THIRTEEN
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE RULED
AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT WHEELER'S
PARKING WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE COLLISION
Ostler pointed out in his opening brief that proximate
causation was present in this case as a matter of law. This is
because Wheeler's negligence i£ parking alongside the freeway
created a risk of harm to passengers in passing cars.

The harm

that occurred arose from one of the risks that made Wheeler
negligent in the first place.

Because the harm that actually

occurred was within the scope of the risk created by Wheeler's
negligence, the subsequent negligence of father Ostler does not
break the chain of causation.

Restatement of Torts, 2d, §442A,
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§442B and §449.iy Wheeler does not deny that the risk of
collision with a negligent passing motori$t is one of the risks
that made Wheeler negligent.
The only factual ground Wheeler suggests for a lack of
proximate causation is to say "all the driver of the plaintiff's
vehicle had to do was. . .not remove his tar from the lane of
traffic until it was safe to do so."
58-59.)

(Re$pondent's Brief, at p.

This response simply says to place all of the fault on

the later negligent actor.

Under the Restatement, that is no

defense:
If the likelihood that a third person may act
in a particular manner is the hazard or one
of the hazards which makes the actor
negligent, such an act whether innocent,
negligent, intentionally tortious, or
criminal does not prevent the aqtor from
being liable for harm caused thereby.
Restatement of Torts, 2d, §449.
Wheeler's final claim is that if the Court adopts §449,
it will make §447 superfluous or purposeless.

Of course the

drafters of the Restatement did not think so.

The comment in

Clause (a) of §447 makes clear that §449 applies if the risk that
a passing motorist will stray into the recovery lane is one of
the risks that made Wheeler negligent.

Acpording to the Comment,

For complete text, see Appendix 3.
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§447 would apply if Wheeler's parking was negligent as to other
persons or risks, not including Ostler.
Wheeler asserts that the Restatement rules "make a
determination of negligence merge with a causation such that
negligence would always be causation,"
59.)

(Respondent's Brief, at

This response fundamentally misunderstands the Restatement

rules of proximate causation.

There may still be negligence

without causation, but only if none of the tests of §447 are met.
Wheeler's main argument is that proximate cause is a
jury question, if reasonable minds could disagree.

Ostler

agrees,, However, in this case, reasonable minds could not
disagree on causation.
If the facts are undisputed, it is usually
the duty of the court to apply to them any
rule which determines the existence or extent
of the negligent actor's liability.
Restatement of Torts, 2d, §453, Comment (b). In this case the
facts were essentially undisputed; father Ostler negligently
drove into the back of a truck negligently parked on the side of
the freeway.

It was the duty of the trial court to apply the

rules of §442A, §442B and §449 to these undisputed facts.

A

correct application of these basic doctrines to these undisputed
facts yields a conclusion of concurrent proximate causation.
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POINT FOURTEEN
TWO RECENT CASES OF THE UTAH
SUPREME COURT ARE IMPORTANT WITH
RESPECT TO THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE THEORY
Ostler's brief claims that the trial court should have
permitted an amendment to claim punitive damages.
Brief of Appellant at p. 38.)

(Substitute

Respondent generally argues that

there was not enough evidence to support £ claim for punitive
damages.

(Brief of Respondent at p. 40.)
After plaintiff's opening brief was filed, the Supreme

Court issued two landmark decisions on the issue of punitive
damages.

Johnson v. Rogers,

P.2d

(_f

90 UAR 3 (1988);

and Miskin v. Carter, 761 P.2d 1378, 90 UAR 19 (1988).
Both Johnson and Miskin confirm the standard for
awarding punitive damages in Utah:
The standard for punitive damages in nonfalse imprisonment cases is thus clear: They
may be imposed for conduct that is willful
and malicious or that manifests la knowing and
reckless indifference and disregard toward
the rights of others.
Johnson v. Rogers, 90 UAR at p. 4.

Compaiie Miskin v. Carter, 90

UAR at p. 20.
However, both Johnson and Miskin reached different
results based upon the specific facts of each case.
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Johnson involved a claim for punitive damages from
drunk driving.
•08.

The statutory presumption for drunk driving is

The defendant in Johnson had a blood alcohol level of ,18

along with other aggravating circumstances.

In Johnson, those

facts did justify the claim for punitive damages.
Miskin also involved a claim for punitive damages for
drunk driving.

However, in Miskin the defendant's blood alcohol

level was .08—exactly the statutory minimum for drunk driving.
There were no other aggravating circumstances in Miskin.

In

Miskin, punitive damages were not allowed.
Taken together, these two cases support the following
proposition:

Where a statute is passed for public safety,

punitive damages will not be allowed if there is only a
borderline violation with no aggravating circumstances.

However,

where a statute is passed for public safety, punitive damages
will be allowed where there is a grave violation of that statute
with aggravating circumstances.
In the instant case, the drive-time regulations were
regulations requiring truck drivers to have a certain amount of
rest or sleep before the driver can drive on the highway.

These

are generally referred to as the 10-Hour Rule, the 15-Hour Rule,

46

and the 70-Hour Rule.^u

These regulations were specifically

passed to get exhausted and impaired drivers off the road.

(R.

2132.)
The preferred testimony is that Wheeler was 25.25 hours
over his 10-hour limit; 26.75 hours over his 15-hour limit; and
86.25 hours over the 70-hour limit.

(R. 2133.)

The proferred

testimony is also that the symptoms for fatigue and alcohol
consumption are synonymous.
aggravating circumstances.
fraudulently.
(R. 2135.)

(R. 2261.)

Finally, there are

Wheeler's driving logs were kept

These driving logs are required by Federal law.

Moreover, the employer (Albina) knew perfectly well

of the violations, and in some sense aided and abetted Wheeler in
driving overtime.

(R. 2134-35.)

Suppose that an airline pilot flew his plane while
drunk, and that a crash occurred.

Obviously, there would be

little difficulty in a claim for punitive damages.

However,

suppose that an airline pilot falsified his time records and flew
while exhausted.
crash occurred.

Suppose the pilot then went to sleep and a
There should still be no difficulty in awarding

punitive damages.

The evidence in this case is that the

symptoms for driving drunk or driving while exhausted are

zu

For text of these regulations, see Brief of Appellant at
p. 8 & 9.
47

identical.

(R. 2261.)

Theoretically, there should be no

difference in result whether the crash is caused by an airline
pilot or a truck driver.

Nor should there be any difference

whether the crash is caused by drunk driving or driving while
exhausted and in violation of government safety regulations.

POINT FIFTEEN
THIS COURT SHOULD REVIEW
THE FOUNDATION FOR OSTLER'S
VIDEOTAPE EXPERIMENT ON A DE NOVO BASIS
Ostler's brief argued that a videotape re-creation of
the accident should have been received into evidence.
tute Brief of Appellant at p. 48.)

(Substi-

Wheeler responded that there

was not a sufficient foundation for the video.

(Brief of

Respondent at
p. 50.)
However, Wheeler's brief fails to respond to Short v.
G.M.C., 320 S.E.2d 19 (N.C. App. 1984).
Appellant at p. 51.)

(Compare Brief of

Short holds that an appellate court should

treat this issue as a matter of law.

In order to assist this

court in ruling on foundation, Ostler will utilize a portion of
his time during oral argument to preview the video for the court.
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Wheeler likewise failed to respond to Ostler's argument
that different standards apply if the video is used for
illustrative purposes, or if the video is used for substantive
testimony.

(Compare Substitute Brief of Appellant at p. 51.)

Also, Wheeler fails to respond to Ostler's argument
that any differences in detail between the actual accident and
the experiment go to weight, not admissibility.
Substitute Brief of Appellant at p. 54-55.)

(Compare

See also Jenkins v.

Snohomish County Public Utility, 713 P.2d 79 (Wash. 1986).
Use of demonstrative evidence has been
encouraged if it accurately illustrates the
facts sought to be proved. The evidence must
be relevant by being material and probative.
Admission of demonstrative evidence is within
the trial court's discretion. The conditions
of the experiment must be substantially
similar to those of the event at issue, but
any dissimilarity goes to the weight of the
evidence, to be evaluated by the jury.
Id. at 84.

(Emphasis added.)

Wheeler's attack relates to a single issue.

The video

shows that the Ostler pickup would have rolled harmlessly into
the desert if the truck had not been illegally parked.

Wheeler

argues that it is only speculation that the pickup would have
gone into the desert.

(Brief of Respondent at p. 51.)

However, there is one living eyewitness to the
accident (Wheeler).

Within hours after the accident, Wheeler

gave the following statement:
49

Did it look like the way this vehicle
was coming when you viewed him in the
rear view mirror that he might have been
going to sleep?

A.

That's exactly what it looked like to
me. I mean, he just, if 1 hadn't been
there, I think he would have just
ran (sic) out into the desert.

(R. 2166 and 2167.)
This case is not unlike Champeau v. Fruehauf Corp., 814
F.2d 1271, 1278 (8th Cir. 1987):
Champeau challenges the admission of a
videotaped experiment into evidence at the
second trial. The experiment showed that if
the driver of a tractor-trailer rig traveling
thirty-five miles per hour took his foot off
of the accelerator one-quarter mile from the
curve that was the scene of the accident and
never accelerated again, the rig would coast
to a stop short of the curve. The purpose of
the experiment was not to recreate the
accident, but to take Champeau's distance and
speed estimates and show that under the
applicable laws of physics the accident could
not have occurred as Champeau had described.

Moreover, the experiment did not need to be
performed in similar circumstances in order
to be admissible because it did not purport
to be a recreation of the accident and it was
merely used to demonstrate general principles
of physics as applied to Champeau's
testimony.
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See Nanda v. Ford Motor Co., 509 F.2d 213, 223 (7th Cir. 1974);
Harkins v. Ford Motor Co., 437 F.2d 276, 278 & n.5 (3d Cir.
1970) .
Thus, there was testimony in the record that father
Ostler would have rolled harmlessly into the desert if the truck
had not been illegally parked.

Therefore, there was foundation

to show the jury how the Ostler vehicle v^ould have responded
under that scenario.

POINT SIXTEEN
QUESTIONS RELATING TO
INSURANCE ARE PROPER ON VOIR DIRE
Ostler argued that the trial court excluded numerous
questions regarding "tort reform propaganda."
of Appellant, at p. 45-48.)

(Substitute Brief

Ostler's general response is that it

is improper to inject the issue of insurance into the trial.
Ostler concedes that it is normally improper to inject
evidence of insurance during the trial.
otherwise during voir dire.

However, the rule is

In fact, it has long been the policy

in Utah to permit questions on insurance during voir dire.

Balle

v. Smith, 81 Utah 179; 17 P.2d 224 (1932); Tjas v. Proctor, 591
P.2d 438 (Utah 1979).

Indeed, the standard J.I.F.U. instruction

indicates thatvmatter# of an interest in an insurance company,
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". . .is perhaps better handled during the voir dire examination
of the jury."

(J.I.F.U. §3.8, Note.)

Although this issue arises from time-to-time, there has
never been a more egregious case in Utah or any other state.

On

the very eve of trialf the insurance carrier representing
defendant (Farmers) sent a propaganda blitz to its policy
holders.

This propaganda blitz told how plaintiff lawyers make

too much money, and cause insurance rates to go up.
Compare Exhibit 5 to this Brief.)
question was very innocent.

(R. 1992.

Ostler's proposed voir dire

Ostler merely asked if any of the

veniremen were insured by Farmers.

(R. 1423, para. 37.)

If this case passes muster, Farmers might buy a fullpage newspaper advertisement with the same message just before
the next big trial.

Or perhaps, Farmers will simply slip a copy

of the advertisement under the door of the jury room.
Insurance companies are making a concerted effort to
pre-condition juries.

If it doesn't stop here--where then?

Wheeler's response is that the court did ask what
magazines the veniremen subscribed to.

(R„ 1420 §4.)

Wheeler

says that the information about the tainted "insurance reform
propaganda" would have come out in response to that question.
(Brief of Respondent, at p. 45-46.)
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Wheeler's response is not in good faith.

The magazine

(or perhaps, more accurately the flyer or booklet) titled,
"Friendly Exchange" comes to all policyholders of Farmers.
one "subscribes" to it, and no one pays for it.

No

There was simply

no way to elicit that information other than to ask which of the
veniremen were insured by Farmers.

CONCLUSION

Ostler seeks a directed verdict against Wheeler on the
issue of proximate cause.

In the alternative, Ostler seeks a new

trial at which the trial court will properly admit evidence,
permit proper impeachment, and correctly instruct the jury on
proximate cause and disallow misstatements of law by opposing
counsel.

If the case is remanded for a new trial, Ostler should

be permitted to add a claim for punitive damages.
DATED this

day of

, 1988.

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Plaintiff

V

.,//••-

•Vv > / • -it > -t v /
B

^

'

/

'

j / \L'lil/HU'

Fok^Robert.

53

J . DeBry

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing REPLY BRIEF (Ostler v. Albina, et al.) was mailed, U.S
Mail, postage prepaid, this

day of

, 1988,

to the following:

M. Dayle Jeffs
JEFFS & JEFFS
90 North 100 East
Provo, UT
84603

/

/ 4/^/
/ / / //
/(
/ &
S /1 /
A

/
-//

/ / / //
/ / /' Ml#
'/

—'For Robert J,. DeBry

/ek

54

', / / /

APPENDIX 1

Ch- 16

LEGAL CAUSE

§ 442

but because of the careless packing of the truck, it causes a heavy
piece of machinery to fall on a pedestrian, the act of B is an
independent intervening force*
Comment on Subsection (2):
d. The active operation of an intervening force may or may
not be a superseding cause which relieves the actor from liability
for another's harm occurring thereafter. Whether it has this
effect is determined by the rules stated in §§ 442-453. A force
due to an act of a third person which is wrongful toward the
other who is harmed may be only a contributory factor in producing the harm. If so, both the actor and the third person are
concurrently liable. This is true although the actor's conduct
has ceased to operate actively and has merely created a condition which is made harmful by the operation of the intervening
force set in motion by the third person's negligent or otherwise
wrongful conduct. However, while there is concurrent liability,
the two forces are not concurrent causes as that term is customarily used. To be a concurrent cause, the effects of the negligent conduct of both the actor and the third person must be in
active and substantially simultaneous operation. (See § 439.)
§ 4 4 2 . Considerations Important in Determining Whether an
Intervening Force is a Superseding Cause
The following considerations are of importance in determining whether an intervening force is a superseding
cause of harm to another:
(a) the fact that its intervention brings about harm
different in kind from that which would otherwise have
resulted from the actor's negligence;
(b) the fact that its operation or the consequences
thereof appear after the event to be extraordinary rather
than norpial in view of the circumstances existing at the
time of its operation;
(c) the fact that the intervening force is operating
independently of any situation created by the actor's
negligence, or, on the other hand, is or is not a normal
result of such a situation;
(d) the fact that the operation of the intervening
force is due to a third person's act or to his failure to
act;
So* Appendix for Reporter'* Rotes, Court Citations, and Cross References
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(e) the fact that the intervening force is due to an
act of a third person which is wrongful toward the
other and as such subjects the third person t|o liability
to him;
(f) the degree of culpability of a wrongful act of a
third person which sets the intervening force in motion.
Comment on Clause (a):
a. As to the statement in Clause (a), see £ 45L
Comment on Clause (b):
6- As to the statement in Clause (b), see $ 435 (2) and
Comments c and d.
Comment on Clause ( c j :
c. As to the statement in Clause (c), see §& 443-449.
d. The words "situation created by the actors negligence"
are used to denote the fact that the actor's negligent conduct
is a substantial factor in bringing about the situation and that,
therefore, the actor would be liable for creating the situation
if the situation were in itself a legal injury.
Comment on Clause (d):
e. As to the statement in Clause (d), see §452.
Comment on Clause ( e ) :
/. As to the statement in Clause (e), see §§447-449.
Comment on (Jause (f):
g. As to the statement in Clause (f), compare § 447 with
§§ 448 and 449.
§ 4 4 2 A . Intervening Force Risked by Actor's Conduct
Where the negligent conduct of the actor creates or increases the foreseeable risk of harm through the intervention of another force, and is a substantial factor in
causing the harm, such intervention is not a superseding
cause.
iSw1 Reporter's Notes.
See Appendix for Reporter'! Votes, Court Citations, and Crow Reference*
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way and thrown across the sidewalk by an unidentified person
who has obviously done so in order to make it possible for
him to use the driveway as a means of reaching B's house.
Thereafter, C, lawfully using the sidewalk of the road as a
guest of B, runs into the barrier in the dark and puts out his
eye. The throwing of the barriers on the sidewalk by the
unidentified man is not a superseding cause of B's barm.
6. If the efforts of one whose right or privilege fs impeded
to remove the impediment or to exercise his right oi: privilege
notwithstanding its existence results in harm to a third person,
there is, in addition to the question of causation, the question
whether the actor's conduct is negligent toward the third person,
as to which see §445, Comment c.
§ 4 4 7 . Negligence of Intervening Acts
The fact that an intervening act of a third person is
negligent in itself or is done in a negligent manner does
not make it a superseding cause of harm to ahother
which the actor's negligent conduct is a substantial
factor in bringing about, if
(a) the actor at the time of his negligent conduct
should have realized that a third person might so act, or
(b) a reasonable man knowing the situation existing
when the act of the third person was done would kiot regard it as highly extraordinary that the third person
had so acted, or
(c) the intervening act is a normal consequence of a
situation created by the actor's conduct and the manner
in which it is done is not extraordinarily negligent.
See Reporter's Notes,
Comment on Clause (a):
a. The statement in Clause (a) applies wherd there is a
realizable likelihood of such an act but the likelihood is not
enough in itself to make the actor's conduct negligent, the conduct being negligent because of other and greater risks which
it entails. If the realizable likelihood that a third person will
act in the negligent manner in which a particular third person
acts is so great as to be the risk or even one of the risks which
make the actor's conduct unreasonably dangerous and therefore
negligent, the case is governed by the rule stated in § 449.
See Appendix for Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References
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Illustration:
1. A loads his truck so carelessly that a slight jolt
might cause its heavy contents to fall from it. He parks
it in a street where to his knowledge small boys congregate
for play. B, one of these boys, tries to climb on the truck.
In so doing he so disturbs the load as to cause a heavy article
to fall upon and hurt C, a comrade standing close by. B's
act is not a superseding cause of C's harm.
Comment on Clause ( b ) :
&. The actor at the time of his negligence may have no
reason to realize that a third person might act in the particular
negligent manner in which the particular third person acts,
because his mind is not centered upon the sequence of events
which may result from his act and therefore he has no reason
to realize that it will create the situation which the third person's
intervening act makes harmful. However, when the situation
is known to exist, the likelihood that some negligent act may
make it dangerous may be easily realizable or even obvious.
Illustration:
2. The same facts as in Illustration 1, except that A
does not intentionally park his car in the street frequented
by the boys, but his car through no fault of his is blocked
in a traffic congestion at this point. B's act in meddling
with the truck is not a superseding cause of C's harm.
Comment on Clause ( c ) :
c. The word "normal" is used in the sense stated in § 443J
Comment b. It, therefore, denotes that the court or jury looking
at the matter after the event and knowing the situation which
existed when the act was done, including the character of the
person subjected to the stimulus of the situation, would not
regard it as extraordinary that such an act, though negligent!
should have been done.
d. The words "situation created by the actor's negligencel'
are used in the sense stated in § 442, Comment d.
e. The words "extraordinarily negligent" denote the fact
that men of ordinary experience and reasonable judgment, IOOKing at the matter after the event and taking into account the
prevalence of that "occasional negligence, which is one of the
See Appendix for Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References
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incidents of human life," would not regard it as extraordinary
that the third person's intervening act should have been done
in the negligent manner in which it was done. Since the third
person's action is a product of the actor's negligent conduct,
there is good reason for holding him responsible for its effects,
even though it be done in a negligent manner, unless thq nature
or extent of the negligence is altogether unusual.
/. The statement in Clause (c) applies to any negligent
act which is a normal consequence of a situation which the actor's
negligent conduct is a substantial factor in creating (seej§§ 443446).
g. While the fact that such an intervening act of la third
person is negligent does not prevent the actor's negligent conduct
from being a legal cause of the harm resulting therefrom to
another, the negligence of the act may be so great or the third
person's conduct so reckless as to make it appear an extraordinary response to the situation created by the actor anil therefore a superseding cause of the other's harm.
h. The rule stated in this Section applies to acts doi^e either
by the person who is harmed or by a third person. If the act
is done by the injured person and is done in a negligent fanner,
it does not prevent the actor's negligence from being a legal
cause of his harm, but it constitutes contributory fault which
precludes him from recovering from the negligent actor (see
§ 467). If it is done by a third person, he, as well as tfie actor
whose negligence has created the situation, is liable to another
injured by it.
§ 4 4 8 . Intentionally Tortious or Criminal Acts Don£ Under
Opportunity Afforded by Actor's Negligence
The act of a third person in committing an intentional
tort or crime is a superseding cause of harm to another
resulting therefrom, although the actor's negligent conduct created a situation which afforded an opportunity
to the third person to commit such a tort or crime, unless
the actor at the time of his negligent conduct realized or
should have realized the likelihood that such a situation
might be created, and that a third person might avail
himself of the opportunity to commit such a tor^ or
crime.
See Reporter's Notes.
:

Appendix for Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross Reference*

480

APPENDIX 3

§ 442

TORTS, SECOND

Ch. 16

(e) the fact that the intervening force is due to an
act of a third person which is wrongful toward the
other and as such subjects the third person tp liability
to him;
(f) the degree of culpability of a wrongful act of a
third person which sets the intervening force in motion.
Comment on Clause (a):
.
a. As to the statement in Clause (a), see § 45L
Comment on Clause (b):
6. As to the statement in Clause (b), see j§ 435 (2) and
Comments c and d.
Comment on Clause (c):
c. As to the statement in Clause (c), see §& 443-449.
d. The words "situation created by the actolr's negligence*
are used to denote the fact that the actor's negligent conduct
is a substantial factor in bringing about the situation and that,
therefore, the actor would be liable for creating the situation
if the situation were in itself a legal injury.
Comment on Clause (d):
e. As to the statement in Clause (d), see (§ 452.
Comment on Clause ( e ) :
/. As to the statement in Clause (e), se0 §§ 447-449.
Comment on Clause ( f ) :
g. As to the statement in Clause (f), compare § 447 with
§§448 and 449.
§ 4 4 2 A . Intervening Force Risked by Actor's Conduct
Where the negligent conduct of the actor creates or increases the foreseeable risk of harm througlji the intervention of another force, and is a substantial factor in
causing the harm, such intervention is not a superseding
cause.
Sw Reporter's Notes.
See Appendix for Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross Reference*
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Comment:
a. The rule stated in this Section applies to any intervening force, whether it be a force of nature, or the act of a human
being, or of an animal.
b. Where the negligence of the actor has created the risk
of harm to another because of the likelihood of such intervention,
the actor is not relieved of responsibility merely because the
risk which he has created has in fact been fulfilled. The same
is true where there is already some existing risk or possibility
of the intervention, but the negligence of the actor has increased
the risk of such intervention, or of harm if it occurs.
Illustration:
1. In the month of December A voluntarily ships
potatoes in an unheated car of B Railroad through the state
of New York. B Railroad negligently delays the shipment
for three days, thereby increasing the already existing r i s k
that the potatoes will be damaged by cold. During the extra
three days severe cold weather sets in, and damages the
potatoes. B Railroad is subject to liability to A.
§ 4 4 2 B , Intervening Force Causing Same Harm as Th it
Risked by Actor's Conduct
Where the negligent conduct of the actor creates or increases the risk of a particular harm and is a substantial
factor in causing that harm, the fact that the harm is
brought about through the intervention of another fores
does not relieve the actor of liability, except where the
harm is intentionally caused by a third person and is
not within the scope of the risk created by the actor's
conduct.
See Reporter's Notes.
Comment::
a- The rule stated in this Section is a special application
of the principle stated in § 435 (1), that the fact that the actor
neither foresaw nor could have foreseen the manner in which
a particular harm is brought about does not prevent his liability where the other conditions necessary to it exist. Compare
Illustration 1 under that Section.
See Appendix for Reporter's Votes, Court Citations, and Cross References
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4. The same facts as in Illustration 3, except that the
pole is knocked over by a cow's bumping into it. The same
result.
5. A negligently leaves an excavation in a public sidewalk, creating the risk that a traveler on the sidewalk will
fall into it. B, passing C on the sidewalk, negligently bumps
into him, and knocks him into the excavation. A is subject
to liability to C.
6. The A Railroad negligently derails a tank car full
of gasoline and damages it, so that gasoline runs into the
public street. The risk is thus created that persons using
the street will be injured by fire or explosion. B, a bystander,
negligently strikes a match to light his cigar. The gasoline
vapor is ignited, and the resulting flash of fire injures C, a
pedestrian on the sidewalk. A Railroad is subject to liability to C.
e. Intentionally tortious or criminal acts. The rule stated
in this Section does not apply where the harm of which the risk
has been created or increased by the actor's conduct is brought
about by the intervening act of a third person which is intentionally tortious or criminal, and is not within the scope of the
risk created by the original negligence. Such tortious or criminal
acts may in themselves be foreseeable, and so within the scope
of the created risk, in which case the actor may still be liable
for the harm, under the rules stated in §§ 448 and 449. But if
they are not, the actor is relieved of responsibility by the intervention of the third person. The reason usually given by the
courts is that in such a case the third person has deliberately
assumed control of the situation, and all responsibility for the
consequences of his act is shifted to him. (Compare § 452 (2).)
Illustrations:
7. The same facts as in Illustration 5, except that B
deliberately kicks C into the excavation. A is not liable to
C.
8. The same facts as in Illustration 6, except that B
deliberately sets fire to the gasoline to see what will happen.
A Railroad is not liable to C.
9. The employees of the A Theatre Company negligently leave a chair on the railing of the balcony, creating
the risk that it may accidentally or negligently be knocked
See Appendix for Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References
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6. If the actor's conduct has created or increased the risk
that a particular harm to the plaintiff will occur, and has been
a substantial factor in causing that harm, it is immaterial to the
actor's liability that the harm is brought about| m a manner
which no one in his position could possibly have been expected
to foresee or anticipate. This is true not only where the result
is produced by the direct operation of the actor's conduct upon
conditions or circumstances existing at the time, but also where
it is brought about through the intervention oij other forces
which the actor could not have expected, whether phey be forces
of nature, or the actions of animals, or those of | third persons
which are not intentionally tortious or criminal. tThis is to say
that any harm which is in itself foreseeable, as to which the actor
has created or increased the recognizable risk, is klways "proximate," no matter how it is brought about, except where there
is such intentionally tortious or criminal intervention, and it is
not within thescope-of the risk created by the original negligent
conduct.
Illustrations:
1. A negligently fails to clean petroleutti residue out
of his oil barge moored at a dock, thus creating the risk
of harm to others in the vicinity through firi or explosion
of gasoline vapor. The barge is struck by |ightning and
explodes, injuring B, a workman on the dock. A is subject
to liability to B.
2. A negligently leaves an obstruction lin the public
highway, creating the risk that those using the highway
will be injured by collision with it. B's horse runs away
with him and charges into the obstruction, and B is injured.
A is subject to liability to B.
3. The A Telephone Company negligently allows its
telephone pole, adjoining the public sidewalk but several feet
from the street, to become riddled with termites, thus creating the risk that the pole will fall or be knocked over and
so injure some person using the sidewalk. An automobile
negligently driven by B at excessive speed leaves the highway, comes up on the sidewalk, and knocks the pole over.
It falls up C, a pedestrian on the sidewalk, anq injures him.
A is subject to liability to C.
Sea Appendix for Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Crosa Beference*
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Railroad Company is a legal cause of the loss of tfye cider
by the theft of the unknown persons.
c. When actor's negligence consists in creating \risk of
criminal action by third person. The actor's conduct may be
negligent solely because he should have recognized that it would
expose the person, land, or chattels, of another to an unreasonable
risk of criminal aggression. If so, it necessarily follows that
the fact that the harm is done by such criminal aggression cannot relieve the actor from liability (see §449). However, it
is not necessary that the conduct should be negligent solely
because of its tendency to afford an oportunity for a third person
to commit the crime. It is enough that the actor should have
realized the likelihood that his conduct would create a temptation
which would be likely to lead to its commission.
This is true although the likelihood that such a crim^ would
be committed might not be of itself enough to make the I actor's
conduct negligent, and the negligent character of the act arises
from the fact that it involves other risks which of themselves
are enough to make it unreasonable, or from such risks together
with the possibility of crime.
§ 4 4 9 . Tortious or Criminal Acts the Probability of Which
Makes Actor's Conduct Negligent
If the likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or one of the hazards which
makes the actor negligent, such an act whether innocent,
negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal does not
prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused
thereby.
See Reporter's Notes.
Comment:
a. This Section should be read together with § 302 IB, and
'che Comments to that Section, which deal with the foreseeable
likelihood of the intentional or even criminal misconduct of a
third person as a hazard which makes the actor's conduct; negligent. As is there stated, the mere possibility or even likelihood
that there may be such misconduct is not in all cases sufficient
to characterize the actor's conduct as negligence. It is only where
the actor is under a duty to the other, because of some relation
between them, to protect him against such misconduct, or where
Appendix for Reporter's Votes, Court Citations, and Cross Reference!
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the actor has undertaken the obligation of doing so, or his conduct
has created or increased the risk of harm through the misconduct, that he becomes negligent.
b. The happening of the very event the likelihood of which
makes the actor's conduct negligent and so subjects the actor
to liability cannot relieve him from liability. The duty to refrain from the act committed or to do the act omitted is imposed
to protect the other from this very danger. To deny recovery
because the other's exposure to the very risk from which it
was the purpose of the duty to protect him resulted in harm
to him, would be to deprive the other of all protection and to
make the duty a nullity.
Illustrations:
1. A is traveling on the train of the B Railway Company. Her ticket entitles her to ride only to Station X,
but she intentionally stays on the train after it has passed
that station. When she arrives at Station Y the conductor
puts her off the train. This occurs late at night after the
station has been closed and the attendants have departed.
The station is situated in a lonely district, and the only
way in which she can reach the neighboring town is by passing a place where to the knowledge of the conductor there
is a construction camp. The construction crew is known to
contain many persons of vicious character. While attempting to pass by this camp, A is attacked and ravished by
some of the construction crew. The B Railway Company
is subject to liability to A.
2. The A Railway Company permits a number of
drunken rowdies to ride in its day coach. No effort is made
by the conductor or train crew to eject them, although their
conduct is insulting and threatening to the other passengers.
One of the rowdies attempts to take liberties with B, a
female passenger, and in the scuffle harms her. The intentional misconduct of the rowdy is not a superseding cause
of B's harm.
3. The train crew of the coal trains of the A Railway
Company are in the habit of throwing out coal to their
families as the train passes through the streets of a village.
The Company knows of this practice but takes no steps
to prevent it. B, while walking on the street, is injured
See Appendix for Reporter's Notes, Court C'tations, and Cross References
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by coal so thrown from one of the Company's trails. The
trainman's act in throwing out the coal without looking to
see whether there was anyone likely to be hit by it is not
a superseding cause of B's harm.
c. Section 294 states in substance that an act or Amission
which negligently puts a third person in peril subjects the actor to
liability to others who are led by their perception of the third
person's peril to bring themselves within reach of the dangerous
effect of the actor's conduct. It is an obvious corollary of this rule
that the act of the other in voluntarily going to the rescue of
the third person cannot be a superseding cause which prevents
the actor's conduct from being the-legal cause of harm which
the other sustains while attempting the rescue and therefore
relieve the actor from liability. So also, there are many precautions, such as locking a door or substituting an alternative
barrier where a gap is lawfully made in the wall of a building
or room, which are designed to protect the chattels contained
in the building or room from theft. The fact that tne thief's
act in taking advantage of the opportunity is criminal does
not make it a superseding cause of the loss of the stolen | chattels.
§ 4 5 0 . Harm Increased or Accelerated by Extraordinary Force
of Nature
The extraordinary operation of a force of nature, which
merely increases or accelerates harm to another which
would otherwise have resulted from the actor's negligent
conduct, does not prevent the actor from being liable for
such harm.
See Reporter's Notes.
Comment:
a. If the actor's conduct is negligent because itl involves
a risk of a particular sort of harm to others, the fact that an
extraordinary operation of a natural force causes harm of such
a sort to occur earlier or to be greater in extent than that which
would have occurred but for its intervention does not relieve
the actor from responsibility for the harm which actually results
from his negligence, if it is substantially impossible to separate
the harm which has been done from that which would have
occurred without the intervention of the force of nature.
See Appendix for Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References

484

APPENDIX 4

Ch. 16

LEGAL CAUSE

§ 435

TITLE B. RULES WHICH DETERMINE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF A NEGLIGENT ACTOR FOR HARM
WHICH HIS CONDUCT IS A SUBSTANTIAL
FACTOR IN PRODUCING
Introductory Note: Only a few of the Sections in this Topic
state rules which restrict liability short of holding the actor for
all the harm of which his negligence is a substantial cause. The
majority of the Sections state either (1) that certain factors,
such as the fact that the actor had no reason to foresee that the
other would be harmed in the precise manner in which the harm
was sustained, are not sufficient to relieve the actor from liability,
or state (2) rules which determine the extent of liability in
certain types of constantly recurring situations. Indeed, the restrictive rules are in almost every instance stated as being exceptions to rules which permit recovery or are stated as being
subject to exceptions permitting recovery.
§ 4 3 5 * Foreseeability of Harm or Manner of Its Occurrence
(1) If the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in
bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor
neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of
the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not
prevent him from being liable.
(2) The actor's conduct may be held not to be a legal
cause of harm to another where after the event and
looking back from the harm to the actor's negligent conduct, it appears to the court highly extraordinary that it
should have brought about the harm.
See Reporter's Notes.
Comment:
a. The fact that the actor, at the time of his negligent
conduct, neither realized nor should have realized that it might
cause harm to another of the particular kind or in the particular
manner in which the harm has in fact occurred, is not of itself
sufficient to prevent him from being liable for the other's harm
if his conduct was negligent toward the other and was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm. However, the manner
in which the harm occurs may involve the cooperation of other
assisting factors so numerous and so important that the actor's
See Appendix for Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References
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negligence cannot be regarded as a substantial factor in bringing
about the harm. (See §433, Clause (a).)
Negligent conduct may result in unforeseeable harmi to another, (1) because the actor neither knows nor should lJnow of
the situation upon which his negligence operates, or (2) because
a second force the operation of which he had no reason to anticipate has been a contributing cause in bringing abc^ut the
harm. In neither case does the unforeseeable nature of the
event necessarily prevent the actor's liability.
Illustrations:
1. The A Company operates a private railroad line on
its own land. This line is curved and crosses the line of the
B Railroad at two points. As the A Company's line approaches the western intersection the view of trains approaching from the west is obscured by a hill so that no
view of approaching trains can be had until a short distance
before the crossing is reached. C, the engineer of a 'fdinky"
engine of the A Company, drives the engine toward the
western intersection at so high a rate of speed that, when
the engine gets past the hill and the engineer has a view
of the B Company's track and sees a train approaching
thereon, he is unable to stop the engine in time to ivoid a
collision with the train. He attempts to do so by reversing
the engine. Seeing that this is going to be ineffectual,
he shuts off the steam and jumps. In so doing the engineer
is acting as a reasonable man would in such an emergency.
The engine is slowed down considerably, so that, although
it collides with the B Company's train, it does no damage
except that it derails the wheels of one of the cars. The jar
of the collision, however, releases the throttle of the 'jdinky"
engine. The "dinky" engine being in reverse, backs and
gathers momentum as it approaches the eastern intersection of the two lines. The derailment of the car of B s train
causes the engineer to slow up and stop across the eastern
intersection, where the "dinky" engine crashes into ^nother
car of the B Company's train in which D is seated as a
passenger, causing him serious harm. A jury may hold the
negligence of A's engineer in driving the engine toward
the intersection at too high a rate of speed to be a substantial factor in bringing about the injury sustained at the
second intersection, although at the time the engineer did
See Appendix for Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References
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so no one would have expected a collision at that point to
occur in that manner. If the jury so finds, the fact that
the engineer had no reason to expect the second collision
does not prevent the A Company from being liable.
2. The A Gas Company negligently permits its gas
main to fall into a leaky condition. The gas permeates the
earth and enters a conduit through which the wires of
an electric light company pass through the building of B.
This conduit has two outlets through B's cellar. One of
them is used for electric lights. The other is not used and
is capped with an iron cap. C, a servant of B, perceives a
slight smell of gas. He calls in C, the fire marshal of the
town, who is passing at the time. They go to the cellar.
While the fire marshal is standing in front of the capped
outlet, C tests the other outlet by applying a match to the
point where he thinks there may be a slight leak. The flame
ignites the gas in this outlet which goes back to the conduit, causing an explosion the force of which hurls the cap
from the unused outlet with such force as to kill C, standing
in front of it. If the negligence of the A Gas Company is
found to be a substantial factor in bringing about C's death,
the A Gas Company is subject to liability.
3. A steamer of the A Line while approaching a bridge
is so negligently navigated that it bumps into the bridge
with sufficient force to throw down and injure men whom the
captain saw working there. The impact causes the death
of B in the following manner: B is a workman who was
engaged in repairing the pilings of the bridge but was not
seen by the captain. He was at work upon a plank the two
ends of which were forced in between the pilings which
supported the dock and kept in place by the tendency of
the pilings to come together. The impact of the vessel
caused the pilings to spring apart. This caused the plank
and B to fall. The plank being thus removed, the pilings
came together, crushing B to death. The A Line is subject
to liability for B's death.
Comment:
&. On the other hand, if the actor should have realized
that his conduct might cause harm to another in substantially the
manner in which it is brought about, the harm is universally regarded as the legal consequence of the actor's negligence. This
See Appendix for Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References
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laintiffs' attorneys, who file
lawsuits on behalf of injured
persons, often call the contingency
fee they charge the key to the
courthouse door. A contingency
fee is an amount of money a
person agrees to pay an attorney
for services in conducting a
lawsuit and is usually a percentage of the amount
recovered. Plaintiffs' attorneys say the contingency fee
allows everyone access to the courts—no matter how
poor they are—because the plaintiff does not need
money to file a suit. The fee is based on an attorney
winning an award for the client. If the client loses, the
attorney receives no pay.
Contigency system spawns suits

Now with plaintiffs' attorneys claiming up to one-half
of the damages awarded to their clients, the
contingency fee is under attack. Many believe the
contingency fee system is a prime reason for the
increase in both lie size and number of lawsuits filed
in recent years. They claim it is in the lawyer's own
interest to build the case to gain the biggest possible
settlement. Others say the victim gets too little of the
award money.
The attorney's fee is only one deduction from the
money awarded to the victim. Also taken out are the
expenses of the lawsuit itself. When the two items are
added together, you can understand why so many
victims complained when they received less of the
award than their attorneys.
The money received by plaintiffs involved in asbestos
injury lawsuits in the last 10 years provides an example
of the problems associated with contingency fees. Of
each dollar of damages awarded, 41 cents typically
went to attorneys for their fees or expenses.
Who really pays the fees?

Who pays the plantiffs' attorneys' contingency fees? It
would be easy to say it is insurance companies and
leave it at that. But ultimatdv it's vou—the

consumer—who pays. It's your insurance premiums
that are the source of the payments to these attorneys.
Thus, these attorneys' fees cost you money daily.
Some states have acted to correct the situation by
putting a cap or maximum limit on the fee that a
plaintiffs attorney can charge an accident victim. In
other states, attorneys are required to file detailed
statements showing how their settlements are spent—
how much is needed to cover necessary expenses, how
much to pay the attorney's fee, and how much to
satisfy the victim's damages.
Many state legislatures are considering other
alternatives, as well. One such alternative is a sliding
fee scale, with the percentage of the settlement that
goes to the victim increasing as the settlement itself
increases. Another idea is to make sure that customers
of legal services have adequate information available to
them when they shop for lawyers. For example,
lawyers might be required to use a standard form
itemizing the fee agreement.
More ideas to consider

Other measures deserving consideration include fines
for filing frivolous lawsuits that are costly to defend,
clog the courts, ai}d require taxpayers to foot the bill
for additional courtrooms, judges, and support
personnel. Anothdr possibility is awards for defense
costs to people wtyo successfully defend themselves and
prevail in suits, so they and their insurance companies
don't have to pay for being proved innocent.
We commend ^11 efforts to bring legal costs into
line and believe tfyat it will serve all aspects of the
public to do so.

Leo E. Denlea Jr(.
Chairman of the [Board and
Chief Executive (pfficer
Farmers Group, Inc.
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COMMENTARY
§ 607.1

Impeachment: Components of Credibility

The modes of impeachment potentially permissible depending upon
the circumstances are (1) reputation for truth and veracity, Rule 608(a),
(2) prior acts of misconduct, Rule 60S(b), (3) prior convictions, Rule 609,
(4) partiality, i.e., interest, bias* corruption or coercion,5 (5) contradiction by other evidence including conduct of the witness himself,6 and (6)
self-contradiction with one's own prior inconsistent statement, Rules
SOl(dXlXA) and 613.7 Impeachment by reference to matters of religion
is never allowed, Rule 610.

